THE New Republic

DEFENSE—
The President's
Sensible Proposals

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A Neutral Zone in Europe?

The Case Against Disengagement—II

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Those "Poor Slobs" . . . . . *John G. Schneider*

The Politics of Purity . . . *Gerald W. Johnson*

WHEN YOUR BOY GROWS UP

Some Advice to the Mothers of America

APRIL 14, 1958

25 cents

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Washington Wire

It's A Pleasure

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER last week wrote one of the strongest messages of his career, proposing to streamline the Pentagon—not mildly but drastically. We hope he succeeds because we believe present service rivalry endangers the nation. Yet the odds are against him, chiefly because reform collides with some of the most jealously guarded vested interests in Congress. Let's face it, Georgia runs defense—Richard Russell (D, Ga.) as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Carl Vinson (D, Ga.) as chairman of the House Committee. They have ladled out defense patronage to Georgia by the megabuck, and other states feed at the same trough. Nevertheless, reform is vital and time is short.

If Eisenhower had offered this program in 1953, he could have put it through without trouble. (He must have known then everything about the Pentagon he knows now!) If he had offered it as late as October in the shock of Sputnik I, he could have put it through easily. But instead the Administration deliberately and painstakingly let the urgency out of the national mood like a boy letting air out of a tire. . . . Still, it's no use to repine. It's a pleasure to back the President whenever it's possible!

Don't Hurry the Horses

WHAT'S NEW on the recession? Well, this week unemployment will probably reach 5.5 million. Signs of recovery which Eisenhower predicted for March aren't yet visible to the naked eye, but he postpones drastic action. Short of omniscience nobody can say, positively, he's wrong, but in view of the record on other matters one has deep misgivings. In fact the Washington scene today engenders maddening frustration — over Sputnik, nuclear tests, school aid, the Summit Conference. The Administration drifts in a Washington opium. As to economy — well, the Administration seems more afraid of inflation in 1960 than of 5.5 million jobless in 1958.

We are saving the front page of the local pro-Eisenhower Scripps-Howard tabloid, the *Washington News* of April 2 and suggest it may become a collector's item. The whole upper half is filled with a three-bank headline, "Ike Moves Against/Hasty Hill Splurge/To Fight Recession." The whole lower half is filled with three photos of Eisenhower practicing golf shots on the White House lawn.

Canadian Conservatism

CANADA'S POPULATION is about 16.5 million, a tenth of the US. Its recession is serious. Here is how it is meeting the crisis. It started deficit financing immediately. Since last September it has pumped $300 million into low-cost housing loans (the equivalent of $3 billion in the US on the 1:10 population ratio). It has pledged $67 million in new Federal grants to the provinces (US equivalent—$670 million). It has cut the auto excise tax from 10 percent to 7.5 percent (the US auto excise is unchanged at 10 percent). It has also increased old age and veterans' pensions, and cut personal income taxes $146 million (US equivalent—$1.46 billion). That's tax-cutting, and it's just started. Washington's next move is even more vital to Canada than Ottawa's. "What makes it worse is," *Business Week* quotes a Toronto economist as saying, "Americans are characteristically too late in using monetary and fiscal remedies to end a recession."

As to the Canadian election, you know that the Conservatives won a landslide—209 seats in Commons out of a possible 265. The title "Conservative" is ironic, although it is true that businessmen generally supported Diefenbaker (in the hope of higher tariffs against the US). But the calibration of the world's political parties is way to the left of America's (the most conservative democracy on earth). A Canadian "Conservative" is a radical New Dealer in the US idiom. Here are some things which the new Canadian Tory Party backs: maintain Canada's present government-run businesses — Dominion radio, ship lines, railroads and the like; radically increased government intervention in other private enterprise — more government support for farms, fisheries, small business, hydroelectric and steam plants; broaden and extend social welfare services, including the new Hospital Insurance; and now a great northern expansion program. No wonder few US newspapers like to discuss what's going on in the great neighborhood to the north.

Aluminum Cushion

MANY US CORPORATIONS give their executives option-rights to buy stock. It is supposed to be an incentive. Give them the right to buy a share at $20, say, and they will try to make the company so profitable that shares will rise to $30 on the market! The Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) has long done this. But shares have dropped from $120 in two years to less than $70. Officials had options to buy 200,000 shares at $117.25, with 10 years to run. They have quietly cancelled this and re-issued the rights, share-for-share, at $68.50, a $9 million price cut. Financial columnist J. A. Livingston notes that the patient ALCOA stockholders did not vote this fairy-tale windfall; they did not even know about it till the annual proxy letter arrived saying it had been done. The executives gave themselves the cushion under corporate authority transferred to them earlier.

Notes

Moscow has built its defense around big armies, the US largely around nuclear weapons; whatever the State and Defense Departments may now say to the contrary, the fact is they don't want nuclear tests suspended.

Poor Dick Nixon has been angling for a showy White House post that would give him real executive experience (the way Vice President Wallace headed the wartime Board of Economic Warfare): Dulles and Adams have headed off every bid for such an appointment and last week Eisenhower told the press "it would be impossible."

T.R.B.

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Correspondence

► *Regulating Broadcasting*

SIRS:

THERE has been a great deal of sensational news about corruption in the Federal Communications Commission. Completely forgotten, however, is the real victim — the ordinary citizen — the radio listener, the TV watcher.

The Communications Act of 1934

(Continued on page 23)

Just "A Gimmick"

Q.—Mr. Secretary [Dulles], in one of your previous comments, I believe you said, you referred to the now projected series of [US] tests. Is any thought being given to calling off these tests?

A.—No, no thought has been given to calling them off.

CONSIDERING the millions of dollars spent annually by private philanthropy in the investigation of matters less consequential than the possible poisoning of the human race, might not Ford or some other foundation consider investigating the sort of questions to which thought *is* given on the summit of the Department of State? The results of such a study might give us a clue as to why our policies are, in Information Director George V. Allen's words last week, having "tough sledding."

Our view, expressed last week, was that a thoughtful and affirmative response by the Department to the Russian announcement of the suspension of further nuclear bomb tests was possible; that the Administration should welcome the Soviet declaration, remind the world that the tests the US is about to run are similar in purpose to those the Soviet Union has just concluded, emphasize our interest in ending all nuclear tests for two years —this suspension to be monitored by the UN inspection teams based on American and Russian soil, state our willingness to separate the bomb test issue from the issue of production of fissionable material, and, finally, ask the Soviet Union to join us in the UN Disarmament Commission in negotiating an internationally-supervised elimination of all nuclear weapons from the arsenals of all nations.

A response of this kind would have been in keeping with the seriousness of the subject. The President, however, could only dismiss the announcement as "a gimmick," and Mr. Dulles appeared to think he had scored a point by stating blandly that "we are not surprised" by the Soviet suspension. The Secretary, as Walter Lippmann wrote several days later,

> chose to treat the Soviet move as a tricky and meaningless propaganda stunt, which they with their closed society can exploit, whereas we in our open and free society are unable to match it. This theory may comfort him but it is . . . a dangerous form of escapism. For it rests on the notion that our many reverses and the decline of our influence are due not to defects in our policies but to the superior advantages of the Soviet Union in propaganda. That is to say, when our products do not sell, the trouble lies not with the engineering in the quality of the product but in the packaging and the advertising. The world would agree with John Foster Dulles if it were not that the world is so gullible that it is being taken in by the Russians. This is flattering to our pride but it is not true.

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And in Guatemala . . .

IN ONE week in Guatemala, two incidents beautifully demonstrated how not to run a propaganda service.

The first was the showing in Guatemala City of a 45 minute documentary on the report of the United Nations Commission on Hungary. The film, with Spanish commentary, was produced by a British company. Its effectiveness as an indictment of Soviet intervention in Hungary is attributable mainly to the fact that its argument rests on the findings of an objective UN body. The audience is persuaded. And then at the end a credit line flashes on the screen: "Presented by the United States Information Agency."

Having taken credit where silence would have been golden, USIA then remained silent when it should have taken credit. The same week this film was being run in Guatemala, a consent decree was agreed to in Washington between the Justice Department and United Fruit Company under the terms of which United Fruit obliges itself to set up out of its own assets a rival company which will import 35 percent of the bananas which UF imported from Guatemala last year. Also, as part of the decree, United Fruit agrees to sell its International Railways of Central America.

The news would have unusual significance to Guatemalans, many of whom have been reluctant to see their national economy so dependent upon one foreign company: United Fruit has owned the only railroad and the only important dock; it has controlled at least 50 percent of the banana production, this being the country's main crop. Some have said United Fruit *is* Guatemala.

But, the USIA in Guatemala City, with its large staff, did not release the story of the consent decree; and when queried, USIA said it had no plans for doing so.

Batista on the Ropes

THAT A government such as that of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba should have been so long spoken of as a link in a chain forged to defend freedom against totalitarian tyranny is a bitter joke, as is much of the oratory one hears about the "free world." And yet, for all the verbal fakery of our diplomacy, the Department of State is not altogether unrealistic. It knows that an ally who loses his head cannot remain an ally, and that if Batista loses out in the fighting in Cuba he cannot count on our continued friendship. (The only outstanding exception to this rule of pragmatic behavior is Chiang Kai-shek.)

Two weeks ago the Department imposed an embargo on further shipments of arms to Batista (as well as on arms to the rebels). It might soon be incumbent upon us to put pressure on Batista to give way and get out, the alternative being a complete breakdown on the island. When and if this moment comes, the Department will be able to find ways for easing his exit. The doctrine of non-intervention has never prevented Washington from doing what it has considered necessary. The doctrine did not prevent Mr. Dulles from offering some public criticism of the way President Sukarno runs things in Indonesia, nor of the way Communists run things anywhere. One recalls too that the condemnation by American Ambassador Spruille Braden in Argentina of Peron some years back was so spirited it practically guaranteed Peron's re-election. As for US intervention in Guatemala, that was the worst-kept secret in diplomatic history.

The primary interest of our government in Latin and South America is today and has always been not democracy, but order. Order has largely meant stability for American investments. (The combined value of direct and indirect US investment in Cuba amounted last year to approximately $1,017,843,000.) For a time, this stability was well protected by Batista. He was considered one of the "best" dictators in the Southern hemisphere.

But by 1956 things had begun to go sour, not for the reason that Batista had done nothing for the people. Quite the contrary: prosperity had given birth to a new middle class in Cuba; economic expectations had been raised. This new middle class (and some parts of the upper class) began to be fed up with the graft and corruption of Batista's rule. The leader of the discontented, Fidel Castro, is himself appropriately one of the new middle class. The rebellion in Cuba is anything but a "workers" movement. Most of Cuban labor, its official spokesmen certainly, is pro-Batista. To hint that Castro is a "revolutionary" in any Marxist sense, or is the enemy of the US and a friend of the Russians is silly.

In desperation, Batista has torn up even the paper rights of the Cubans: any judge who rules against a government official or agency is threatened with firing; anyone joining a general strike is threatened with the loss of his job; any employer calling for a work stoppage is to be jailed; anyone who kills a striker in order to continue his work is promised immunity from prosecution. About the only thing Batista promises to hold sacred is, in his words, "the deposits, savings accounts and safety deposit boxes in all the national and foreign banks."

We often chide the Administration for moralizing too much. But might not a small amount of indignation now be in order? Batista looks as if he is on the ropes. It may soon be safe to be right.

Kennan Has the Razor

A POINT to be remembered by followers of the debate between George F. Kennan and the critics of his disengagement proposals is that Kennan enjoys a great advantage in that his argument can be easily translated from the stately language of polemic into the vulgar tongue, while that of his opponents cannot. If some precinct captain told the boys in the political club,

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"Kennan says what we should say to the Commies in Central Europe is, 'Let's the both of us get the hell out of here before some bastard drops the watermelon'," he would be pretty faithfully summarizing the Reith Lectures. But how could he summarize the argument of Dean Acheson and the rest?

This is not conclusive proof that Kennan is right. Occam's Razor, the principle that no complicated explanation is to be accepted when a simpler one will do, is not the last word in logic, but it is an effective weapon in controversy; and up to this point it has been Kennan who wields the razor—at least elsewhere than in his native land.

Design for Space

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER has overtaken Lyndon Johnson in the race to outer space. The Senate Majority Leader, who understood the implications of Sputnik and quickly put his brand on the space issue, was all set to begin a center-ring investigation of space problems as soon as Congress comes back to work. Now the President has handed Johnson's committee a well-thought-out program instead of a vague problem to consider.

The "Space Primer" and the "National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958" released by the White House during two recent Presidential stopovers between Augusta and Gettysburg represent the thinking of the Scientific Advisory Committee which Dr. James Killian recruited after he joined the Presidential staff. The Primer gives scientific answers in words of few syllables to the questions Congress will ask: Why, with all the unanswered scientific questions around us on earth, should we start seeking out new problems in space? And how can the results possibly justify the cost? They are convincing and exciting answers; the Primer, which is to get mass distribution, lays a solid public-relations base for Congressional passage of the proposed Space Act this year.

The Act itself, almost everyone of competence agrees, is aimed in the right direction—toward central civilian direction of all US space activities. Scientists who share the views of Dr. David Hill and his colleagues at the Los Alamos Atomic Energy Laboratory (See "For Civilian Leadership in the Space Age," *NR*, February 3, 1958) do not think it guards us sufficiently from military control of space. They will support the plan as a promising beginning, however. And the skillful drafting of the bill—worthy of Lyndon Johnson for finesse—will disarm most other potential critics.

To meet the objection that a civilian program would interfere with defense space projects, the bill provides that the Department of Defense will retain control over "those projects primarily associated with military requirements." Ambitious Air Force generals see that this loophole is large enough to accommodate Project Pied Piper, the new Man-in-Space Project, and almost any other major exploration for which they can get the funds from Congress; they have no doubt of their ability to outsell any civilian agency in this department.

The fact that the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics is to be the nucleus of the new National Aeronautics and Space Agency also helps the Pentagon swallow the pill of civilian entry into space. The services have cooperated amicably with NACA for 40 years and consider it far less difficult than some new civilian group might be. The aircraft-missile industry takes the same attitude. After all, James H. Doolittle, as illustrious a figure in the aircraft industry as he has been in the Air Force, is Chairman of the NACA board, and the president of the Aircraft Industries Association, former Gen. Orval Cook, was one of the first to recommend NACA for the space job. Most professional scientific societies too have learned to trust NACA through membership on its advisory committees.

Enthusiastic astronauts will be predisposed toward the bill because of the broad mandate it gives the new Agency. NACA would have authority to develop, test and operate aircraft, missiles and space vehicles of all kinds, in laboratories it now operates or will construct, through contracts with individuals, universities, or private plants, at sites it may buy or lease. And the bill has the added attraction of being worded to cover future projects we may not even dream of today.

Almost everyone concerned, then, is reasonably satisfied with the President's space plan except those who have hoped that space exploration can serve to diminish rather than add to world tensions. It is possible, they feel, to make space exploration an international effort, as the development of nuclear energy might have been after Nagasaki. The new Space Board of 17, who will advise the Agency on policy, and the Agency itself are the ones to try to bring this about. There is nothing in the proposed legislation, even these critics acknowledge, which would prevent such leadership by the US. But neither is there now a specific instruction that the Space Agency take the initiative to give space exploration an international character.

Congress could greatly improve the chance of doing that by amending the proposed act in three ways:

1. It should be made clear beyond any doubt, as the President's message states, that it is "the concern of our Nation that outer space be devoted to peaceful and scientific purposes . . ." and that the part of the program in military hands be kept carefully in check.

2. It should contain no classification clauses covering new information developed. From the purely national military view secrecy impedes technical progress on our projects; internationally it makes cooperation hopelessly complicated. In this space field, where we are certainly

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not ahead of the Russians, we are in a position to make a magnanimous gesture. The most that a policy of non-secrecy is liable to reveal is how far behind in space science we are—and that would be helpful for the public to know.

3. Congress should amend the proposed Act to provide that the Space Agency is "authorized and directed" to take steps toward the establishment of an international space laboratory, in cooperation with all the United Nations.

With such a firm mandate much would be possible—with the right people in charge and the right people advising them.

Farm Bill Veto

THE PRESIDENT was ill-advised, economically and politically, to veto the farm price-support freeze. Whether in terms of economic equity or of next November's votes, a measure which would further deflate farm income at a time when measures to boost city purchasing power are bursting out all over seems incongruous.

The price supports to which Mr. Eisenhower objects are in the lower range of the 75-95 percent of parity authorized under the Administration's bill last year—corn at 77 percent, cotton at 78, wheat and butterfat at 80, rice at 82, and milk at 83, as compared with the announced support levels for the 1958 crop year of 75 percent for all major basic commodities except corn (77 percent) and cotton (81 percent).

An effort will be made to override the veto, possibly right after the Congressional Easter recess, possibly not until a month or so later, when the flush period of spring pasture will bring milk prices down seasonally. (It was Secretary Benson's announcement of the cut-back to 75 percent on milk price supports as of April 1 that touched off the freeze controversy.)

Meanwhile, back on the farm, and especially at the offices of the farm organizations, bills for a long-range revision of agricultural legislation are sprouting. Most are old friends. Senators Hickenlooper, Dirksen, Martin of Iowa and Bricker have introduced S 3049, an Administration proposal to provide still more flexibility to price supports by allowing a range of 60-90 percent; Secretary Benson has testified for it. The Senate Agriculture Committee staff has put together a 195-page omnibus.

PL 480, authorizing the sale of surpluses abroad for foreign currencies which can then be used for US support of economic development, now pending in the House, will probably be extended, with the Administration asking for one year and $1 billion, and the Senate approving two years and $1.5 billion per year. In the House, an effort is being made to include "income deficit payments" along with crop purchases and loans as a technique of support; use of these would make possible an upper cut-off limit to payments and so avoid super-size government checks to large farmers.

After the recess, however, the American Farm Bureau Federation plans to have introduced, with bipartisan support, a program on corn, other feed grains and cotton, which would get away from the parity concept and from acreage allocations. Corn would be supported at 90 percent of the market price of the three previous years; the price support of other feed grains would be set in relation to their feed value compared to corn. In 1957, this program would have given a corn support price of $1.22 a bushel as compared with $1.38 under the parity program. The parallel cotton proposal would keep acreage allotments but otherwise follow the pattern for corn.

INTERVIEWS

with

James Thurber, Leonard Bernstein,
Frank Lloyd Wright, Isador Rabi,
Ben Shahn and others

will appear in The New Republic
this spring and summer.

The Right To Travel

WHETHER the State Department eventually retreats from its indefensible position in the William Worthy case—as it has in some passport cases so as to head off a Supreme Court test—will depend in part on press response to Mr. Worthy's latest legal move. The complaint filed in Federal District Court in Washington last week in Mr. Worthy's behalf by the American Civil Liberties Union is not the first court test of the State Department's right to refuse a passport. But it is the first test of this right, unencumbered by side issues, in which the press has had such a clear reason to lend friendly support. Past cases such as that of the late Albert Einstein's friend Otto Nathan have involved alleged Communist associations or the refusal to sign a non-Communist oath. In this instance, however, Mr. Worthy bases his case primarily on his constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The State Department's refusal to renew Worthy's passport after his visit to Communist China in December, 1956, maintains the ACLU, has been an "arbitrary, capricious" interference with his right to earn his livelihood as a foreign correspondent. Mr. Worthy has already suffered

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from the repeated delays of the Board of Passport Appeals, which did not give its final opinion until March 24 of this year. For us, the principle in the Worthy case is a simple but elementary one: the right to go and see for oneself, and to report what one finds.

Murder by the Networks

WHAT ONE subject has prompted more mail to Congress since the first of the year than any other? You're wrong. The subject is Pay-TV. The television networks and local stations are against the system because they say it would ruin them by buying away talent. Proponents argue that the public should have a chance to buy better programs than they can get now. The letter writers practically all supported the network-local station position. Could this have been because so many television networks and individual stations used their own medium to state only their case to their listeners?

In what was billed as "an explanation" of the issue, *Congressional Quarterly* reports as an example, station KLTV in Tyler, Texas—affiliated with ABC, CBS and NBC—told viewers to write their representatives and the FCC "asking for their support in keeping television free." Result: 88,067 signatures on various types of mail with only three favoring Pay-TV. The station forwarded its mail to the House Commerce Committee. The Committee was at that moment deciding whether to ask the FCC to call off a scheduled trial of Pay-TV.

The House Committee itself received 50,000 pieces of mail on this question—the greatest volume staff members recall ever receiving. The Committee has since requested the FCC to delay the Pay-TV tests.

Abundance in Minnesota

THE ABUNDANCE of political talent in Minnesota, where there are three outstanding possibilities for the Senatorial nomination on the Democratic side alone, is one of the brighter spots on the November horizon. The three candidates are former Ambassador to Denmark Eugenie Anderson, Rep. Eugene McCarthy, and Lt. Gov. Carl Rolvaag; the selection of one of these three unusually impressive political figures as party nominee at the May 23-25 state convention in Rochester, Minnesota, will be influenced greatly by two other extraordinarily able public servants, Senator Hubert Humphrey and Governor Orville Freeman.

Humphrey, of course, provides in his own strenuous leadership a good part of the explanation for Minnesota's embarrassment of political riches in the Democratic Party. But the explanation also lies in the political history which produced Humphrey: the populist tradition built by the old Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and the intellectual push given to the merged Democratic-Farmer-Labor forces following World War II by a close-knit, politically active group at the University of Minnesota.

Most remarkable thing of all about Minnesota in this tenth year after Humphrey's first successful Senate campaign is not that three highly qualified Democrats are rivals for a Senatorial nomination (or that now both Humphrey-for-President and Freeman-for-President voices can be heard), but that so many leading Democrats in one state, all so good, have been able to stand political prosperity and still stand together.

THE ADAMSES

THE importance of being Adams
Is an axiom historical
That nobody underrates.
An Adams is indispensable as guide and oracle
In the United States.

Since John and Henry Adams
Without the slightest hesitancy,
For service to the cause,
Were nominated, and elected to the Presidency
With national applause,

Since Samuel and Henry Adams
On missions confidential
Earned diplomatic fame,
And winning prestige more than Presidential,
Shed lustre on their name,

One of the family Adams
(Who would rather be right than be President)
Since Washington went to war,
In the White House has been necessarily resident,
Or in the house next door.

Reverence for the House of Adams,
Spontaneous and natural,
Of nation-wide extent,
Likewise belongs to namesakes not in the direct or collateral
Adams line of descent.

AN entirely unrelated Adams
Installed in the President's residence
Enjoys without a doubt
An understood but unconstitutional precedence,
Pushing Vice Presidents out.

The importance of being Adams
Empowers the current resident
To stand in the President's place,
But when the Vice President also prefers to stand in for the President,
That rather alters the case.

SAGITTARIUS

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American Culture
In Search of Angels—IV

SINCE millionaires, at least in parts of the country other than Texas, have become scarcer, cultural institutions are turning increasingly to new sources for endowment, special gifts and contributions to their annual budgets. One of the replacements for the angels of yesteryear is the "corporate citizen."

Today, money originating in corporate businesses is vulnerable to a three-pronged levy on behalf of culture. Many of the tycoons at the top of the business pyramid have interests in painting, music, architecture, which, once known, become the basis of solicitation; foundations, established on company stock either by the company's founder or by its board, become sought-after sources of grants; and the annual budget of the corporation itself is increasingly likely to include contributions for cultural activities. For example, the collection of Americana in the Ford Museum at Dearborn, Michigan, is due to the direct interest of the first Henry Ford; the Ford Foundation has for some years been a major source of grants to education, and has recently become a cautious giver in the field of the creative arts; the Ford Motor Company Fund, in addition to support for scientific research, provides annually some 70 scholarships for children of employees and support for the institutions which they elect to attend. Kress, IBM, and A&P money, to name only a few more, has been similarly used.

The concept of the "corporate citizen" is mostly new since the war. In fact, until the Smith case, which a stockholder brought to challenge the right of the directors of the A. P. Smith Co. to make a gift to Princeton University, was settled in favor of the donor corporation, it was uncertain whether legal barriers might exist to the use of earnings for gifts unrelated to a company's day-to-day business. But since then, corporate giving, particularly in support of higher education, has risen rapidly, and forms an increasing segment of total resources.

In the nature of things, there is always a large public-relations element in corporate support of cultural activities. Sometimes the advantage to the corporation is specific, measurable and direct; sometimes it belongs under the more general category of good will.

To the latter category belongs the relation between companies and culture which occurs as part of their advertising programs, especially on TV and radio—some would say that the relation is usually not one between companies and culture but between companies and kitsch. Yet with corporations as sponsors, various orchestras, certain playhouse programs, guest appearances of singers and instrumentalists, ballet, experimental programs such as Omnibus, have made it possible for millions of viewers to see and hear performances of merit, and have offered support to writers, composers, performers, directors. The corporate sponsor, as any network knows, has most of the sensitivities, vagaries and unpredictable lapses that characterized the individual angels who patronized the arts in earlier days. But with a little bit of luck one can occasionally serve art and the paymaster at the same time.

In the category of specific advantage to the company, though the cause of higher education is simultaneously served, is the budgeting of increasing corporate support of the upgrading of the educational level of employees. GE's 1957 annual report gives a page to listing its employee development program—one in seven of its staff are engaged in learning something on company funds and in numerous cases on company time. The something ranges from in-service technical training through college courses entered into by employees or their children with the help of the GE loan fund to company-paid study for advanced professional degrees.

Many corporations have been impressed with the attractiveness of scholarships for children of employees as a fringe benefit important in holding key staff members; occasionally company programs are also open to children of stockholders. (Education itself, in its corporate form, has seen the value of such plans: Princeton gives $500 a year toward the expenses of faculty children who go to college.)

Likewise, many corporations give scholarships open on a competitive basis outside the roster of staff families, and contribute to alumni funds and college budgets. Some of the larger among them—General Motors, for instance—operate their own testing and selecting systems for scholarship awards. Others among the giants, and many smaller corporations, do their educational giving through pools.

Two kinds of pools have developed. The National Merit Scholarship Corporation, Inc., set up on a Ford grant a few years ago, receives and matches corporate funds—Sears Roebuck was the first and is still the largest contributor—for award on a sliding scale proportioned to financial need to winners of nation-wide examinations set and graded by NMSC and given to prospective members of each year's freshman class.

In 39 states, starting with the Associated Colleges of Indiana, organizations of colleges have been formed, whose presidents, usually hunting in pairs, spend up to 20 days a year in joint solicitation of corporations doing business in the state. Of their take, 60 percent is divided equally among the participating colleges, and 40 percent prorated among them on the basis of enrollment. In general, the members of these associations are the smaller liberal arts colleges; unaccredited or junior colleges are not normally included, and the largest colleges tend to

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stay out—Notre Dame, for instance, does not participate—on the ground that they can do better separately.

All of this machinery gives the donating corporation the good will that goes to a contributor, plus a measure of protection against a public relations kick-back against what they do not do. When the "corporate alumnus" provides scholarships whose recipients choose their own colleges, or matches the individual alumni gifts of its own staff, the necessity of making first-hand choices which might become targets of attack is pleasantly avoided. Yet while shy, the corporate alumnus is increasingly open-handed—for most corporations, the question of educational support has become not whether, but how, to do it.

Corporate giving to other forms of cultural activity, particularly the performing arts, is currently about where corporate giving to education was five years ago. Much of it is localized in cities, and tied in with urban renewal efforts. In the 1950's, some 50 arts councils coordinated through the American Symphony Orchestra League, have been set up in as many municipalities; most of them conduct annual drives for funds to be used for local orchestras, lectures, art exhibits, festivals. Business groups are increasingly prominent contributors to such funds: the annual budget of the Fort Wayne Art Foundation is supplied by 14 local concerns; the Cincinnati Institute of Fine Arts gets about half its budget from business.

Biggest of the current projects of this sort is the drive for the new Lincoln Center in New York City—of its $75 million goal for buildings, scholarships, experimental production costs for opera, concerts, ballet, some 10 percent is being sought from corporations. In all these cases, the restoration of life to metropolitan areas left in decay by suburban outmigration and the money which will be brought into the city by the attraction of artistic performances and exhibitions is held out to corporate contributors as justification for their interest.

Yet the gap between what corporations could give and what they are now giving is wide enough to encourage further initiative. In 1929, the corporate income-tax return provided no line for the deduction of tax-free contributions. Today, five percent of new income is tax-deductible. In 1954, nearly three quarters of a million corporations filed income-tax returns, and five percent of their combined net incomes of $36.6 billion was $1.8 billion; yet their actual deductions for all classes of contributions was $313,764,000 or 0.86 percent.

Perhaps a third of the contributions now made go to higher education—such gifts passed the $100 million mark in 1956 at the same time that a similar figure was reached by individual alumni fund givers.

Giving for other cultural purposes was much smaller—a 1956 study showed only 2.5 cents of each corporate gift dollar going to civic and cultural activities.

So while the American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel believes the over-all figure on corporate contributions to have risen to something over $520 million in 1957, there is still ample scope for increased support of culture by the corporate patron.

HELEN HILL MILLER

BARUCH, BARUCH, BARUCH

NOTHING is more dangerous than this notion that economic salvation lies through government intercession. Government did not keep us from getting into our present condition. How can we rely upon it to get us out of it? . . . Self-help is the best help. A nation, no less than an individual, must keep its financial house in order. Its financial strength, no less than an individual's, will determine its capacity to withstand economic adversity. The credit of the United States Government is the foundation upon which our solvency and security rests. . . . We must prevent any further weakening of it by tax cuts, or deficit spending, or lifting the borrowing ceiling every time the debt presses against it.

—BERNARD M. BARUCH, April 1, 1958

THE SPIRIT OF DEFEATISM and pessimism has been broken and the United States is at last emerging from its economic depression into a new era of growth and prosperity, Bernard M. Baruch, former chairman of the War Industries Board, told members of the war organization who assembled at a reunion luncheon meeting at the Hotel Savoy Plaza yesterday. . . . "Of one thing we are certain—that the United States of America will keep its dollars and its bonds sound beyond question of a doubt. That can be done only by balancing our budget, by cutting down expenditures and increasing taxation. . . . I firmly agree that the government should be kept out of any form of employment insurance. I agree that the burden is a social obligation and should be taken care of primarily by industry, by employers and employees."

Referring to Soviet Russia, Mr. Baruch said that it was no longer a bogey and that "it is no longer with fear that we look upon Soviet Russia, but rather with sympathy."

—*New York Times*, November 12, 1931

I HAVE RESPECTED his [Mr. Baruch's] opinion over the years, as most of you know. I have been rather intimate with him for thirty years and listened to him and certainly I take all of his advice seriously.

—PRESIDENT DWIGHT EISENHOWER, Press Conference, April 2, 1958

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The Superficial Aspect

The Politics of Purity

On March 28 the Associated Press quoted Robert T. Bartley, a member of the Federal Communications Commission, as saying, "I sincerely believe that my record as a commissioner will stand the closest scrutiny."

In the same dispatch Rosel H. Hyde, also a member of the FCC, was quoted as saying "with obvious emotion" that the charges against him were "utterly unwarranted."

Uh-huh. Nevertheless, the quotations bring to mind an editorial paragraph written many years ago by, if memory serves, the late Bob Gonzales, of the Columbia, S. C., *State*. It read: "So live, O Politician, that you will never have to rise and declare, in a voice choked with emotion, that you court the fullest investigation."

One trouble with the current regime in Washington is that it scorns that advice. Yet it is sound. It is sounder than the theory that seems to pervade the capital at present, namely, the theory that if it is legal it doesn't stink. Sometimes it does.

The public journals have not as yet recorded any act on the part of a member of the FCC that is plainly criminal within the meaning of the law; but a man who thinks the aroma around the commission's premises is attar of roses had better consult a doctor, for his nose is out of joint.

When any man in position, as a representative of the public, to grant or withhold valuable rights and privileges, accepts costly gifts from applicants, or allows them to pay his hotel bills or other expenses, the transaction may be perfectly legal, but it smells bad. The man involved may be as upright as the Washington Monument, but a gagging populace will harbor doubts.

Outside Washington this has been well understood for at least a couple of thousand years (*vide* I Thessalonians, 5:22) but apparently it has not yet percolated into this Administration. The contrary view prevails there—since public office is a public trust, it is an outrage not to trust everyone in public office.

Well, we don't, and that's a fact of life. Nor is this distrust, let me add, a campaign smear concocted for partisan purposes. Commissioner Bartley is a nephew of the Speaker of the House, who is a Democrat. One of the other names brought into the affair is that of an in-law of the President of the United States, who is a Republican. The stink clings impartially to the garments of both parties.

Perhaps for this reason tremendous efforts have been made to hush up the affair or at least to decry its importance. Both Bartley and Hyde admitted that they had allowed the industry they are supposed to regulate to pay hotel bills for them, although they were collecting the regular government allowance for living expenses on the same trips. Still, Representative Harris, a member of the investigating committee, praised Hyde's "long and distinguished record of public service," and said that no one doubts his integrity and honesty.

All right, Harris, if that's your idea of an honest and distinguished public servant, that's the kind of a man you like. *De gustibus*—but it would be thoughtful of you to keep your good friends downwind from the rest of us.

It was only three months after his first inauguration that President Eisenhower unctuously announced that if the Republicans had done nothing else at least they had "raised the moral tone of Washington." Oh, boy!

Yet Ike isn't a satirist. He believed it then, and with his magnificent capacity for not knowing what goes on under his nose, he probably believes it now. There is a parable perhaps in the one positive accomplishment of his Administration—it has removed the image of the subversive and non-church-going Jefferson from the three-cent postage stamp, replacing it with the Statue of Liberty and the boldly-printed motto, "In God We Trust."

Well, when relatives of the highest and mightiest come into the aura of suspicion, there is nobody else we can trust in the 69 square miles of the District, so the motto is perhaps appropriate. But there is a subtler symbolism in the exchange of Long Tom for the Lady in Bronze—we have removed the man and substituted a monument elsewhere than on the postage stamp.

There was much human nature in Give-'em-Hell Harry, so much that when one of his boys began to stink Harry's own face turned red and he threw the offender out on his ear. But a committee, or a headquarters staff doesn't react like a man. Five of Ike's more odorous specimens have been dismissed, but none with a kick, and one with an honorary review and a medal! A monument can do no wrong, nor is it capable of blushing; but its erection on the highest place is not universally regarded as elevation of the moral tone. Some call it idolatry.

Gerald W. Johnson

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To the Mothers of America

ON THE DAY my old Harvard history prof, Sam Morison, took off his mortarboard and tramped off to Oxford to give a lecture in his admiral's hat, the age of the military pundit was officially upon us. Dr. Sam, who had won his stars writing Navy histories during World War II, never went back to the title of professor once the shooting was over. And, on arriving in England, he made a statement to the press about military strategy and foreign policy. It was a long haul, indeed, from the days when Dr. Sam lectured on such matters as the Maypole at Merry Mount, and the flight of Ann Hutchinson to Rhode Island.

Admiral Sam is no more aware of my distress over his evolution than he was of me as a student. But I regard him as a bit of a symbol. In these days of five-star college presidents, of Generals of the Army in charge of Remington Rand, and of Admirals telling us how to run the school, Dr. Sam had read the handwriting on the wall. To be an authority on anything, nothing helped more than to have a gold stripe on the sleeve or a silvery constellation on the shoulder. Faced with a choice of two titles, both merited but one deserved more than the other, Dr. Sam took the one less earned but more impressive. And I can't say I blame him. Who'd take the word of a history professor over the word of an Admiral on anything?

But let's proceed from Dr. Sam. Styles are changing. Beginning with a decline in the radiance from the White House, the tide of Generals and Admirals seems to be receding along with the economy. We haven't had a General in the Cabinet for years, and Princeton even appointed a philosophy professor its new president. Maybe this is a Good Thing. I am not sure. It all depends on what the next style in peerless leaders is going to be. Public Relations Executives? Policemen? I'll wait and see before I clap my hands at the passing of the military man from grace.

If I wanted to be an unimpeachable authority, I'd be a Policeman. By this I don't mean the ordinary hard-working patrolman, wearing a heavy blue uniform on hot days and pounding the beat for Law and Order. Such Policemen are never considered authorities; they are called Cops. They are also badly paid and footsore. No, I am speaking about Policemen who specialize in big problems like saving the nation from juvenile delinquency, bootlegging, and subversion. More particularly I am speaking about specialists on the highest levels: top echelon Policemen. You can look about you for a long while and never find an authority like one special law-enforcement official whom we all know and revere. He has been paid by the government a long while to catch criminals of various types, and catch them he does. But the apprehension of interstate malefactors is not his only function. As I said, he is also an authority on almost everything you will find in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. He has one amazing capacity. All he has to do to become an authority on a subject is to express an opinion on the subject.

For instance, the Big Policeman has a solution for juvenile delinquency. He tells parents they should make their children go to Sunday School. The day after the speech, the papers carry his suggestion in detail. Compare this with the pitiful showing of all the books and speeches by people like teachers, psychiatrists, judges and social workers. Who listens to them? Other teachers, psychiatrists, judges and social workers.

Or take the Big Policeman on such aggravating matters as constitutional law or civil liberties. Simply by commenting he penetrates the mists of debate. He is reported fully and precisely. His picture runs in the adjoining column. Editorials reiterate his points.

I've always told myself I was going to write a big, fat, successful book some day and sell it to the movies. This has been a self-deception, because I am nobody and easily discouraged. To do an authoritative book you have to be powerful and you have to be sure. Like the Big Policeman. He wrote a book about how to save America from Communism. It is a handy compendium of history, Marx, Engels, Stalin, Lenin, the revolution, intrigue, how to spot a disloyal American and the importance of snooping on your neighbors in the interests of national defense. It has sold 100,000 copies because it is broad and because it is sure. All the reviewers liked it. Only one critic got into trouble. Like Dr. Oppenheimer, he didn't enthuse, so George Sokolsky did a column on him.

THE BEST part of being the Big Policeman is his built-in security. General-presidents, Admiral-educators, five-star Secretaries of State and artillery-captain music critics get investigated, Congressmen blast them, sometimes; very often they get retired, either by promotion boards or by the electorate. But the Big Policeman goes on forever. Nobody investigates him. People buy his books by the ton. He knows all the secrets about everybody. He can scare hell out of any Senator, and often does. He has the biggest finger-print collection in the world, but his own hand is invisible. He is the only American who never got pushed around by somebody.

The moral of this story is intended for the Mothers of America, to whom the Big Policeman has spoken many times as a counselor and friend: Don't be disappointed if your little boy says he wants to be a Policeman when he grows up. Encourage him. Set the little devil at it. Buy him a tin badge tomorrow. What if he doesn't want to be President? Who wants to be President? Look what happened to Hoover. Herbert, that is.

JOSEPH P. LYFORD

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Reorganization of the Defense Establishment

THE PRESIDENT'S plan for the reorganization of Defense is quite an unprecedented display of courage and initiative on his part. The plan is a compromise, but on the whole a good one. It should get wide support, including the Congressional support required to put it completely into effect. As with other Presidential plans, however, whether widespread support is forthcoming depends considerably on the energy and persistence Mr. Eisenhower puts into his advocacy.

It will not entirely satisfy advocates of a single military service nor will the little caesars in the military committees on Capitol Hill be appeased by the concessions made to their sensibilities. But the proposed move is the logical next step to be taken in the glacial process of converting the old static military establishment of a second-rate power that could relax between wars into the sensitive and dynamic instrument required of a great power confronted daily with the choice between alternatives that might lead to better security or to annihilation.

It will be complained that the authority Mr. Eisenhower wishes to give the Secretary of Defense is more than one man can handle. This nonsense should get short shift. Big as the Secretary's job will be, the President's job will be far bigger. Neither job, of course, can actually be handled by one man, but the one needs to be embodied in one man just as much as the other has to be. Also it ought to be considered that the Presidency will be more manageable if the Commander-in-Chief has a single deputy for defense, and not a cabal to deal with, as too often has been the case in the past.

It will be complained that the Army, Navy and Air Force with their separate Secretaries will go into partial eclipse. So they will and so they should. But their responsibilities for personnel recruitment and training, for procurement and for management of the still vast establishments under their control will give them plenty to do. The military services are retained as separate entities, with only minor changes—the President has already directed that promotion above the two-star rank shall come to him from the Secretary of Defense, and he is asking Congress for authority to transfer officers between services, with their consent. It is true that when strategic planning and the direction of all the operational forces becomes the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs as a body, with a strengthened and integrated joint staff, the center of defense gravity will shift upward from the separate services to the Department of Defense. But that is where it belongs.

"Think there's been enough meeting of minds yet?"

The service Chiefs continue to be the military heads of their separate services as well as members of the Joint Chiefs, though their deputies are to be given larger roles to relieve the Chiefs of most of their service responsibilities. This is presumably in part a concession to the separate service advocates; it is also an effort to solve one of the knottiest of all defense problems: how to get effective joint direction of our military affairs without separating authority from responsibility. It may not work in the long run, but it is no worse than the present arrangement and may prove to be an improvement. Presently, most of the Chiefs' command responsibilities are exercised at the service level; after the reorganization goes into effect most of the critical command responsibilities will be joint.

Almost certainly major opposition on Capitol Hill will be aroused by the proposal to allow the Secretary of Defense greater authority to control the allocation of funds among the various services and to assign their functions to them. This runs against Congress' prerogatives of determining the roles and missions of the services in broad outlines and the money they spend in detail. It implies, therefore, a frontal challenge to the special Congressional groups supporting the Navy, and especially the Marine Corps, the National Guard, and other embattled establishments—or establishments that consider themselves embattled. The President's proposals will not be known in detail until draft legislation is submitted, but already he has directed that the next Defense budget

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be submitted "in a form to accomplish these ends"—whatever they are.

This issue of allocation of funds goes to the very heart of our national defense problem. Traditionally, the great decisions regarding the kind of defense we are to maintain have been debated in a public forum, with particular interests—those preferring B-36 bombers to aircraft carriers, for example—pressuring Congressmen, propagandizing the public and in general generating a great deal more heat than light. This procedure, while it has not left the country defenseless, has also not saved us from grievous error. Congress has not proved itself capable of developing an independent philosophy of the national defense and imposing it on the Administration. Also Congress has not been able to correct erroneous official strategic doctrines. But neither, of course, will giving the Administration a freer hand save us from strategic fallacies that originate in the White House and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On balance, then, it is doubtful if the proposed Defense reorganization will substantially affect this problem, which is the most serious one we have. On the other hand, the reorganization the President wants will greatly increase the effectiveness of the Defense establishment once it gets on the right track, and it may just possibly be that a truly integrated joint staff will come up with better recommendations on strategic doctrine than the present competitive system has done.

One of the most encouraging things about the plan is the President's stated intention that "all of our operational forces be organized into truly unified commands." For from this principle there could emerge a more effectively organized Continental Defense Command, an Anti-Submarine Command (which we do not now have), a Strategic Command that encompasses more than just nuclear bombers, and—above all to our way of thinking—*a joint task force capable of fighting small wars.* This last would bring together the land, sea and air components needed for a prompt and effective response to limited threats far from our shores. The existence of such a task force would automatically generate the elaborate plans required to make its own employment possible, plans that are not now being made because it is nobody's job to make them. Moreover, the force might be able to get from the Defense Department and from Congress, the long-overdue modernization of equipment needed for limited war. Thus, in time, we should no longer be dependent on a single Marine battalion as our only alternative to employing nuclear obliteration to exert our military force in the Middle East—these being the alternatives available to us now, if we had to move quickly to carry out the Eisenhower Doctrine.

A Neutral Zone in Europe?

The Case Against Disengagement—II

by JAMES E. KING, JR.

AT THE END of the first part of this critique it was concluded that NATO's current military doctrines and forces all too closely resemble what Mr. George F. Kennan said in his Reith Lectures on the BBC that they ought to be, with the unhappy consequence that many people in Britain and on the Continent have convinced themselves that Mr. Kennan is right to insist that West Germany's part in NATO is more a danger to the West than a source of strength and stability, and are willing to bargain with whatever West Germany does contribute to NATO strength in an effort to buy from the Russians a relaxation of the tensions in Central Europe they find intolerable.

There was, in fact, not much that was new in this latest expression of George Kennan's views. The credited father of "containment" has never considered it likely that Russian Communism would use military force to expand its domain; he therefore was opposed to the Truman Doctrine to aid Greece and Turkey against Communist pressure, and he disapproved of West German participation in the defense of Western Europe from the first. What others have regarded as proof of Russian willingness to use force when they think they can get away with it, from the Greek Civil War, through the Berlin blockade, to the Korean War and Vietnam, has never convinced George Kennan, who stands today upon the estimate he made in 1947:

> While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to *political* realities. . . . like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in

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> a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism . . . it is a *sine qua non* of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance *not too detrimental to Russian prestige.* (Italics added.)

Thus he has alway mistrusted the West's use of *military* pressures as being likely to raise questions of prestige for the Russians and cause them to resort to irresponsible action.

FOR these reasons "disengagement," to George Kennan, as he first suggested it back in the days when the idea of NATO was being formed, was a proposal to reduce the military pressure on the Russians in Central Europe, in order to enable them to retreat, without loss of prestige, before the inherent political pressures generated by their unwelcome domination of the satellites. The difficulty with his thesis then, of course, was that the demobilization of the West had gone so far that there was virtually no military pressure upon the Russians, who had maintained their military forces in great strength. Consequently the opposed view, which was that the West must remobilize sufficiently to stem the Communist tide, then (1947-49) at flood as the independencies of Eastern Europe one after another succumbed to internal subversion based upon the proximity of Russian forces even when the Red Army was not present on their soil, seemed to most of Mr. Kennan's colleagues in the US Government much more in line with the "realities" of the situation.

To most West Europeans also, the latter view, which of course became official US and Western policy, was at that time more convincing. They were deeply disturbed by the military threat implied in Russia's big army, and counted upon the US to guarantee their security by the threat of using its new atom bombs. At that time, however, it was not the intention of the US Government to rely exclusively upon the nuclear "deterrent," and early NATO plans called for a substantial conventional (non-nuclear) rearmament of the NATO countries. Subsequently, the failure of all the NATO countries (including the US) to meet their agreed forces goals, plus the 1953 New Look defense policy of "more bang for a buck," resulted in NATO's excessive, indeed almost exclusive, dependence upon nuclear deterrence. And this, now that the USSR has become a full-blown nuclear power, with both "tactical" and "strategic" weapons and delivery means, is what has produced the conviction so widely held in Britain and on the Continent today that NATO can defend itself only by committing suicide. Add the strong feeling that the unstable situation in Central and Eastern Europe might result in a conflict desired by neither the Russians and the West, but which both are powerless to avoid, and the case for a wide acceptance of "disengagement" is complete.

Mr. Denis Healey, who presented his case for disengagement in three parts in this journal recently (issues of March 17, 24 and 31) is one of those who have come to advocate disengagement out of disillusionment with NATO defense policies. Until recently he was an ardent proponent of "tactical nuclear defense" of NATO, believing that NATO forces, if they were armed with "small" nuclear weapons, could balance the numerical superiority of Russian forces, and thereby deter the latter from attack by posing the threat of an effective but limited defense that need not doom the people of Western Europe to destruction. Lately Mr. Healey has lost confidence in this escape from the paralyzing implications of nuclear deterrence. Referring to the article by Secretary Dulles in the October, 1957, issue of *Foreign Affairs,* in which the possibility of a limited and non-annihilating nuclear defense of Western Europe was proposed, Mr. Healey says:

> the immediate reaction of the Continental countries to the suggestion of limited nuclear defense was totally negative. . . . They see the new trend as an attempt to spare America horrors which she is quite prepared to see inflicted on her allies.

Healey's statement of his disengagement case, while easy reading, is a gross oversimplification that does little credit either to the quality of his usual comprehension of international problems, or, presumably, to the depth of his convictions in the present situation. He says, for example, that present NATO defense policies rest upon two "unconscious assumptions" both "demonstrably false." The alleged assumptions are that the only danger of war lies in a deliberate act of Soviet military aggression and that the US would respond by "massive thermonuclear retaliation to any major Soviet attack." The first, however, is by no means an assumption of the NATO governments, nor of the NATO military commanders, who are quite as concerned as Mr. Healey is about the possibility of "ambiguous" political pressures from the Russian side, and about spontaneous outbreaks, not planned deliberately by the Russians, that might result in war. And the second, providing the phrase "major Soviet attack" is taken literally, is certainly not "demonstrably false." Also there is about his expressed hopes for the political results of a disengagement in Central Europe an unmistakably political pie-in-the-sky quality that is surprising, giving it the flavor of a campaign brochure for the British Labour Party. Thus, he says that disengagement would

> . . . involve a revolution in the Cold War . . . the great powers would have to start seeking security in cooperation rather than in conflict . . . it could be a turning point in the long history of mankind's search for peace.

Mr. Healey raises the specter of a Hungarian-type rebellion in East Germany as the major incalculable risk

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involved in the present situation, arguing that the Suez War and the Hungarian rebellion prove that "neither Russia nor America has sufficient control over events on its own side of the Iron Curtain to rule out the possibility of such a local conflict." It is indeed ironic that the possibility of an outbreak in East Germany is intimidating so many thoughtful people in the West, in whose favor it would be initiated, while it seems not to intimidate the Russians, against whom it would be directed. Indeed, this one disturbing possibility seems to be making more converts for a policy of disengagement than all the other arguments for it put together.

What is implied by Healey's fear, of course, is that if the East Germans revolted tomorrow against their Communist overlords, and against the Russian forces stationed on their territory, as the Hungarians did, the West Germans would intervene to aid their brothers and the West would then be dragged into a war with the Soviet Union. That there is *some* danger of this chain of events it would be foolish to deny. But also it seems quite unnecessary to assume that the danger is great, and in any case it is sheer defeatism to be intimidated by it.

It should be remembered that NATO is a *defensive* alliance. It does not sanction aggression by NATO members against third parties. The West Germans know perfectly well, particularly with Suez as a precedent, what the US attitude would be if they engaged in openly aggressive military action, no matter how urgent their reasons might be. Moreover, with the threat of nuclear annihilation hanging over them, it is difficult to believe that the West Germans would be swept away by their emotions. Such "intervention" as might occur, whether undertaken privately, or in a covert fashion by the West German Government, would almost certainly not be identifiable as open "aggression," would not offer a direct challenge to Soviet military power, and therefore would not be considered by the Russians as adequate cause for them to assume the risks of nuclear annihilation either.

ACTUALLY, if NATO were armed for a local defense in Western Europe that would not automatically convert a local conflict into a war of annihilation, there seems to be no reason why support should not be offered to East German rebels. If we really believe that military conflict can and must be limited in the nuclear age, it must be because we assume that both the West and the Russians will behave rationally—that is, in their self-interest—in a situation such as this one. NATO's action, therefore, would not constitute a threat to Russia's ultimate security, and Russia's counter-action would not take the form of an act of suicide. But more important than NATO's actually taking action to aid an East German rebellion would be NATO's *ability* to take such action. Because if NATO's European armaments were such as to prove this ability, and thereby indicate a possible intention to act, then the Russians would have to calculate the risks of suppressing a rebellion in East Germany, just as the West must calculate the risks of intervening. This would be a great improvement over the present situation, whereby the Russians are virtually guaranteed a free hand by the announced policies of the Western governments not to intervene in Eastern Europe, and by the fact that NATO lacks adequate military force of the type required for a limited intervention or a limited defense. If NATO had such forces at its disposal it might result, for example, in a relaxation of Communist pressures on East Germany in order to reduce the possibility of a rebellion.

Mr. Healey is quite right to point out the double irony in a passage he quotes from the *London Times* in which it was said that, "It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Western Europe is indebted to Herr Ulbricht," the East German Communist boss, for keeping such a firm grip that there have been no further outbreaks since the riots in East Berlin in 1953. Moreover, he may be right to say that the status quo in Central Europe "has always been morally intolerable." But when he goes on to say that it is "now revealed as politically most unstable and full of appalling military dangers" he is only reflecting the Western crisis of confidence.

Like George Kennan, Denis Healey appears to believe

IN HIS rebuttal last week to George Kennan's views, Contributing Editor JAMES E. KING, JR., argued that proposals for "disengagement" — East-West military withdrawals from a neutralized, mutually guaranteed and inspected zone in Central and Eastern Europe—are the inevitable reaction to a foreign policy which relies on the imagined "deterrent effect of threatened nuclear retaliation." Neither the US nor the USSR, he wrote, really bases its diplomacy on any expectation that the other will initiate suicidal nuclear war. Yet the danger of nuclear catastrophe implicit in the doctrine of massive retaliation has "intimidated" Kennan and others who fear that the armies of East and West are too close for safety in mid-Europe. Mr. King does *not* fear that East and West will "stumble into a war of nuclear annihilation," but he does fear that the governments of the West "might fail to provide the military weapons and forces appropriate to less than total war." To propose that Germany be unified on terms the Russians will accept, and then be neutralized outside the North Atlantic Community, is to arouse unjustified hopes that "the removal of this focal center of tensions will *demilitarize* the Cold War."

Here, Mr. King examines further the specific "disengagement" blueprint offered in three recent issues of this journal by DENIS HEALEY: Soviet evacuation of "at least Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia," Western withdrawal back to the Low Countries and France.

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that the Russians must want a disengagement as much as he does. What he actually says on this point, however, is inconclusive, and to some extent seems contradictory. For example, he remarks that "it is now clear that Soviet control of Eastern Europe depends on the presence of the Red Army." Yet he says in another place that even after a disengagement "most of [the satellites] would remain friendly to the Soviet Union and would retain many of the economic and social characteristics of a Communist society." But if this is the case Soviet control obviously does not depend upon the presence of the Red Army in most of the satellite countries and there is nothing to prevent the Russians from applying the pattern of Poland, a gradual liberation, more widely. In fact, the argument always comes back to East Germany. It is there that the Russian presence is "morally intolerable" (though certainly not to a Communist) and that the status quo is "full of appalling dangers."

He makes a different point, however, when he adds that the threat of additional nuclear powers has led both sides in the Cold War, "for the first time in history," to take a genuine interest in disarmament, and that "it is now clear that disarmament can start only with a pilot scheme in the limitation, inspection and control of armaments. . . ." But when he concludes that Central Europe is the ideal area for such a pilot scheme because it "is not vital to either America or Russia" and because "the two sides have a common interest in cooperation rather than in conflict," he seems to have parted company with history. Surely Central Europe is a center of tensions just because the opposed interests there are considered vital by both sides, hardly a situation that can easily be shifted from conflict to cooperation.

With Mr. Healey's "blueprint for mutual withdrawal" (*NR*, March 31) there would be little reason to quarrel, provided he had really justified his disengagement. But the crux of the matter is that he and others who think as he does regard the "Question of Germany" as presenting an intolerable risk of war. They are proposing a solution there is no indication that the Russians—who have insisted repeatedly upon their own solution of the German issue—will accept, and a solution that would gravely weaken the West just where it most needs to recruit its strength. Moreover, there are good reasons for believing that the situation in Europe following a disengagement, even one that went exactly the way Healey wants it to go, would be less stable and even more "full of appalling dangers" than is the present situation. In order to explore these reasons briefly, I want to ask three questions relating to subjects which Mr. Healey has omitted from his discussion, or which he has passed over rather too hastily.

► First, what happens to Western Europe during the long period that both Mr. Kennan and Mr. Healey concede would be necessary for the negotiation of disengagement, and then afterwards?

George Kennan noted, belatedly, in the very last lecture (after he had apparently eliminated Germany from the "Western spiritual and cultural community") "the exciting progress" made recently in Western Europe toward integration. Mr. Healey does not mention it at all. There has indeed been substantial progress toward a united Western Europe, the basic impulse of which is political, though the institutions so far devised (Schuman Plan, Euratom and the Common Market) are economic. The question, then, is: can the military arrangements for the defense of Western Europe be so cleanly separated from the economic and political life of Western Europe that isolating Germany in the first respect would not affect its participation in the second? To anyone who comes to this question from a background in postwar German affairs there can only be one answer: Even the proposal that a disengagement be negotiated would begin to divert Germany's attention from the West, and during the long process of negotiation, and even more afterwards, if a disengagement were agreed, the German domestic political scene would be subjected to irresistible pressures from other directions. The best guess is that Germany's national purposes would eventually change completely, either toward a "third force" effort to play West off against East, or at least toward concentration upon a drive to control the neutral zone itself. The great vision of a Franco-German reconciliation, which has motivated men like Schuman and Adenauer, would come to nothing. To the French, Germany would again become an object of fear and suspicion, to be inspected, harassed, and kept as weak as possible. To the Germans, France, which would certainly be most insistent among the Western powers upon a rigorous application of the arms inspection, would become a hostile force, seeking to undermine German strength and security and thus to render her vulnerable to the inevitable pressures from the East.

► The second question I address to the advocates of disengagement is: what, in all this, are the most likely prospects for Central and Eastern Europe after a disengagement? Professor Hans Morgenthau has suggested (in the March *Commentary*) that the neutral zone would eventually become a new German empire. It is, indeed, probable that the Germans would feel themselves compelled to work toward that as an objective. But it is improbable that they would succeed, so long as the Russians could prevent it. The best likelihood, then, is that the neutral zone would be torn apart by hostility between the Germans on the one side—who would be hoping for Western support and blaming every failure of the West actually to support them upon the French—and the Poles and Czechs on the other, dependent upon Russian support, and getting it so long as they "remain

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friendly to the Soviet Union" and "retain many of the economic and social characteristics of a Communist society." In other words, East and West would still be engaged in Cold War in the heart of Europe, though with two major differences. The West would have weakened itself gravely, not only by having disowned West Germany, but also by having allowed the Franco-German enmity to be reborn. In addition, what Mr. Kennan describes as the present "abnormal" situation in Central and Eastern Europe would have been replaced by a far more unstable one. Perhaps it is "abnormal" for Russian power to be extended so far to the West. But at least we know what it is and where it stops. After a disengagement we could not be so sure; it is possible, indeed, that we might not know, in the political and psychological in-fighting in the neutral zone—a form of conflict in which we do not often outshine the Kremlin—just how far the Germans were actually on our side.

► My third and final question is this: if the source of Western insecurity is the unsatisfactory nature of a defense based too largely on the nuclear "deterrent," marked by an inadequacy of local collective defense, why has the obvious remedy been ruled out? Surely, the obvious remedy is to build up NATO's local military forces, particularly their capacity for a conventional defense. George Kennan, as we have seen, has little confidence in collective local defenses in any form. Denis Healey has apparently lost confidence even in the effectiveness of a local "tactical" nuclear defense. But Kennan and Healey both rule out a local conventional defense, simply by assuming that once troops have nuclear weapons, as the US and British troops on the continent do now, they either cannot or will not fight without using them. At the same time, both emphasize the deterrent and defensive effect of German conventional forces, once Germany is *outside* NATO. And Healey argues that Polish conventional forces would in effect be added to the German by a disengagement, and Polish territory to German territory, to provide a stronger conventional buffer between NATO and Russian nuclear forces.

As for the twin assumptions that troops armed with nuclear weapons will use them without authority, or would be ineffective if the nuclear weapons were not used, there is little warrant for either in military opinion. Moreover, it is difficult to see why, if German conventional forces are expected to be effective outside of NATO, they would not be even more effective within the NATO commands. And as for the Polish military forces, it can reasonably be argued that they are a more valuable asset to the West now than after a disengagement. For, at the moment, Polish fear and mistrust of Germany is mitigated by the belief that Germany is constrained by its close association with the West in NATO. And it may be, as a consequence of this, that the Russians cannot really count upon Polish military support against the West in any kind of military operation that is not clearly defensive. But after a disengagement, the Poles would probably welcome Russian help against the Germans in almost any circumstances.

We come then to the conclusion that a disengagement that would satisfy Mr. Kennan and Mr. Healey would only confirm and perpetuate the weakness of NATO precisely where it most needs strengthening—and that is in its ability to maintain a usable local defense in Western Europe. Moreover, it would create a new status quo in Central Europe more racked by tensions and "appalling dangers" than the one it replaced. This conclusion may seem depressingly negative, in a situation that cries out for positive action. But it applies only to the proposals that have been examined here, and specifically to the separation of the German Federal Republic from NATO and from Western Europe. It is not to be construed as an endorsement of other foreign and defense policies of the US Government, nor of the manner in which those policies have been carried out.

Certain of those policies have been more than a little responsible for the dangerous—indeed potentially disastrous—crisis of confidence in Britain and on the Continent today. For though the precise date could not be foretold on which the peoples of the West would come to realize that they could no longer rely for their security exclusively on deterrence based upon the predominant nuclear power of the US, it was as sure as anything ever can be that such a day was coming—and soon. Yet none of the NATO governments did anything to prepare their people for the coming shock. When Mr. Dulles last October finally got around to a public acknowledgment of the possible shortcomings of "massive retaliation" against a power fully capable of returning the favor, it was, indeed, too late to repair the damage that easily.

There is perhaps little reason to believe that this Administration can repair the damage, though it may be able to weather the worst of it by stubbornly hanging on. What is needed is not only a more flexible and a more confident diplomacy and more finesse in the propaganda phases of the Cold War, as so many critics of the Administration have demanded. What is needed even more is a new philosophy of NATO defense that will not paralyze the spirits of the people it is intended to defend. There must be a soft-pedal on "deterrence" by declamation and a return to the effort to build versatile local defenses in Western Europe. This kind of rearmament, which calls mainly for conventional forces, is not inconsistent with an over-all disarmament, for in any negotiated disarmament the objective must be to reduce the West's reliance upon nuclear military force while at the same time balancing the total military forces (nuclear and conventional) of East and West at a lower level.

Next week Klaus Knorr, author of The War Potential of Nations, *will continue our discussion of disengagement.*

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Gunther Invades Russia

by Walter Z. Laqueur

THE inevitable has happened, the last terra incognita on Mr. John Gunther's map of the world has disappeared: The outcome of a trip to Russia in 1956-7 is a highly readable and entertaining account. Prospective visitors with Intourist (and there seems to be no other way for the time being) will study Mr. Gunther's observations with profit; general readers will be struck by the number of grand pianos manufactured last year in the Soviet Union (mostly in Estonia—37,000) and the fact that in contemporary Moscow one must always check overcoat, hat and galoshes at all public places such as restaurants, museums and theatres. There are many more such fascinating items, as well as short profiles of the post-Stalin generation of Soviet leaders and thumbnail sketches of some of the main cities in European Russia.

Inside Russia Today, by John Gunther (Harper; $5.95).

Some of the political observations are penetrating, others a bit on the naïve side. The author relates his impression that the Soviet leadership has a very strong dislike for Mr. Truman, whereas President Eisenhower even if surrounded by evil and unscrupulous advisers, is a man of good will in their eyes. And Mr. Gunther adds: "One may assume that this will be news to Pennsylvania Avenue." It will be news to nobody at all; the Soviet leadership has believed for many years that President Eisenhower is easier to handle—and not just because of his friendly association with Marshal Zhukov during the war. Misleading, too, is the author's frequent use of the key word "intellectual" in his profiles of the Soviet leaders. Suslov, for instance, is seldom seen at parties—he is supposed to be "too loftily intellectual for such frivolous pursuits;" Mrs. Furtseva is "burningly, blindingly intellectual." Mr. Gunther is the only known observer hitherto blinded by Mrs. Furtseva's intellectual capacity, with the possible exception of Mr. Edward Crankshaw. Shrewdness and a political acumen are prerequisites for the rise to the top in Moscow, but being blindingly intellectual is a positive disadvantage in the Soviet and most other capitals. And if Mr. Shepilov should indeed have written fifty books, as the author says (and the reviewer doubts)—see what happened to him. He has been given the opportunity to write more books.

AS AGAINST this Mr. Gunther has some useful things to say about war and peace and coexistence, and he makes some important points in his discussion of the attitudes of some Asian and Middle Eastern countries towards the Soviet Union; for example, that a country may become friendly to Moscow not merely by reason of Communist subversion or blandishment, but because it *likes* aspects of Communism and Russian policy, because the Soviet system seems to offer more than ours. This important fact has unfortunately not been realized in many Western circles to this very day; "Popular Democracies" of Eastern Europe are written off as "communistic" whereas some of the pro-Communist countries of Asia and the Middle East are the mistaken objects of great hopes and expectations. In reality, most of the European satellites are a pain in the neck as far as Moscow is concerned, whereas countries such as Indonesia or Syria offer much better prospects than the Soviets could ever hope for in Eastern Europe. It may take a few more years until these basic truths and their implications are understood at last. For these and similar insights Mr. Gunther's book is incomparably better than the average travelogue and popular political survey of 1938 or 1948. But it is more ambitious too; it sets out not merely to describe what the author saw or heard but to "explore the new Russia with all its contradictions and fascinating complexities" and to provide answers to many questions arising of the recent history of the Soviet Union. And at this point, Mr. Gunther's well-tried methods, so successfully applied in other continents, have their limitations. It is not merely the impossibility of providing a history of Russia in half an hour and a description and analysis of Marxism in two minutes. For an understanding of the Soviet Union in 1958 a study of the theory and practice of Communism is at least as important as Dostoevsky quotations and variations on the "plus-ça-change" theme. This has become a highly specialized field and Mr. Gunther's reliance on guides is commendable; I only wish he would have been somewhat more discriminate in his choice of ideological cicerones. Some, to be sure, are excellent. The choice of others, defined by the author as outstanding authorities, is incomprehensible.

For the last decade or so the study of Soviet affairs has proceeded on the academic level, the journalistic level, and on some levels in between. Mr. Gunther mainly relies on political journalism and there is nothing essentially wrong with that; some of the articles and books produced by political journalists are as good as the best produced in the universities—quite apart from being more readable. But there is also much that is worthless—and this goes for some of the more fashionable commentators in the field, too. Publishers, editors and Mr. Gunther find it extremely hard to make up their mind between various commentators and schools of thinking; to be on the safe side they rely on writers who have already established reputations (*i.e.*, authors whose names are familiar to readers of the press).

THE RESULTS of the application of this safety-first device are unfortunate as far as public opinion is concerned: It would be a miracle if a public exposed for any length of time to the muddled ideas, impressions and inspirations of quasi-experts would not be affected by it.

With better advice Mr. Gunther would have presumably produced a more realistic picture of the scope and content of de-Stalinization; a sentence like "scarcely a day passes without news of some historian or other being given

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the sack for clinging despite the contemporary enlightenment, to Stalinist hallucinations is unfortunately very far from the truth, and there are many statements in a similar vein. (Some of the more obvious inaccuracies have been revised in last minute footnotes, but too many have remained). Nor is it likely that Mr. Isaac Deutscher will be overjoyed that Gunther made use in 1958 of one of his less successful sweeping predictions made some time ago, namely that Mao's "hundred flowers" speech was an event of the greatest historical importance, an even more radical repudiation of Stalinism than the Khrushchev speech. We all know what happened. . . .

There are two basic obstacles which made it far more difficult to write *Inside Russia* than *Inside Africa*, or *Inside Latin America*. One, already mentioned, is the all-pervasive importance of political theory; one need not worry about intricate ideological problems when describing the state of affairs in Paraguay or Nyasaland. The other obstacle is the totalitarian state. One not only has a hard time getting information; worse yet, the style of the writer is cramped. For totalitarianism is an ugly word, and while there are many ways and adjectives to describe people and places, there are but few to describe life in a state organized in a totalitarian way.

There has been a growing gap in recent years between the more and more specialized contributions of Soviet experts, and the general public, and books like *Inside Russia Today* may partly close it. If it were a medical work one might describe it as an anatomy rather than a physiology of the body; one wishes the author had examined the brain as thoroughly as the extremities.

In Defense of Exurbia

by the Rev. Peter Salmon

THE TIME has come when some one must stand up to defend Connecticut's Fairfield County against its traducers, and in reporting on *Mackerel Plaza*, the latest fictional onslaught, I propose to do just this. Moreover, in criticizing this new novel, which my colleague, the Reverend Andrew Mackerel, has written under the patent penname of Peter DeVries (a man who, in two previous works, *The Tunnel of Love* and *Comfort Me With Apples*, has written so wittily and truly of the county as to draw his fellow-residents away even from their television sets to the point where, as I once remarked, "You can't see DeForest for DeVries"), I wish to expose, for the sake of DeVries' reputation, this imposter masquerading under his name.

The Mackerel Plaza, by Peter DeVries (Little-Brown; $3.75).

Let me put my cards on the table, therefore, by saying that I, Peter Salmon, am minister of the Liberal Peoples Church in our town of Avalon. I do not wish to go into the many reasons why we saw fit to depart from Mackerel's split-level church. The unpleasant facts concerning Mackerel's un-ministerial conduct are proclaimed in his book, and while I could probably disguise them here with a believable enough fabrication, I, unlike Mackerel, am a gentleman of the cloth, but not of the whole cloth. Nor will I, again unlike Mackerel, dwell upon the vagaries of my own parishioners, one of whom, a local printer, offered to donate a rather unusual font, which we had to turn down because it was the wrong type. Indeed, I will do no more than mention briefly the obvious and forced nomenclature used for his characters by Mackerel—the policeman named Chance who is given the nickname "Fat"; or Mackerel's fear lest his own divinity school sobriquet of "Holy" become known in Avalon. I could myself reveal that in that same divinity school I was occasionally referred to as "Salmon called Peter." But, as I once said of Middletown, "That is neither here nor there."

No, let me plunge forthwith into Mackerel's technique. First, as to his puns, which, as the English nobleman remarked of the New England colonies, are peerless, and which hint strongly of the genuine DeVries. Mackerel, I suspect, has collected these puns over a period of years and then built his novel around them. I am convinced that the idea for the book grew out of a conversation between himself and Molly Calico, the girl he was courting after the sad demise of his first wife. When Molly, wondering why he had ever become a clergyman said, "It certainly can't be for the money," he replied, "No, there is no jack in the pulpit." I smile at this now, even as I laughed aloud when first I read it, but this does not keep me from thinking it a flimsy basis for a plot. If I am correct in assuming that his book had in these puns its genesis, I cannot help murmuring, "Would it had found there instead its exodus."

Then there is the matter of the set pieces, so amusing in themselves. There are more of these in *Mackerel Plaza* than in a clock merchant's shop, albeit a small shop. Virtually every chapter has its own little story, only vaguely relevant to the plot, which the author has wrenched into context.

And there is Mackerel's carelessness, forgiveable in a tyro, but unpardonable when committed under the name of DeVries. For example, the line on page 135, "She was naked except for skirt, blouse, underthings, shoes and stockings," which reappears on page 190 as "She was . . . naked except for a green skirt and sweater, etc." There is, too, his double misuse, so surprising in an avowed connoisseur of words, of "careen," which he twice mistakes for "career."

THERE are other points I could make, but charity bids me desist. Let me instead return to the defense of my dearly beloved Fairfield County. Fairfield, though really a most pleasant place to live in, has been subjected to more plagues than even it deserves. It is frozen by snow in the winter, pelted by rain in the spring, parched by drought in the summer, buffeted by hurricanes in the fall. During most seasons the water from the skies, the rivers and Long Island Sound cover our town, and especially my own basement, so thoroughly that I have often been moved to propose that Avalon be re-christened Lyonnesse. Regardless of the weather, Fairfield is beset at all times by the New Haven railroad, sports cars, advertising executives, cocktail parties and Republicans;

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but, above all else, it has been cruelly misrepresented by its own funny writers, whose profession permits them to live in more salubrious spots, but who prefer to remain within an hour's commute of the literary agents in New York City.

I am reminded of the words of that earlier exurbanite, Piers Plowman, whose vision was of "a fair field full of folk," and who, in describing the various rascals there resident, excoriated most enthusiastically those

> Jesters and buffoons, Judas' children
> [Who] Found for themselves fantasies
> and of themselves fools made.

And I beg of their modern counterparts, such as Mackerel, to leave Fairfield and Connecticut and find some yet unmined territory into which they may sink their shafts. Let them bring an end to their tired comedies of naïve young men (incarnated cocktail stirrers who muddle through to eventual triumph), of beautiful young ladies (whose burgeoning bosoms and beckoning buttocks are revealed, in the crucial chapter, to accompany the unassailable purity of a Little Orphan Annie) and of wily natives (who switch suddenly from invincible illiteracy to cogent comments on obscure sayings of Voltaire), and let us, for a time, remain unchronicled.

Though what Tom Ewell would then do for acting vehicles, I cannot easily foretell.

Those "Poor Slobs"

by John G. Schneider

As EVERY harassed ad man knows, there must be over one hundred million authorities on the advertising business, its folkways and mores, its men and methods. The businessman-client is an authority because he pays for the stuff: and never mind the *non sequitur*—since when must businessmen be rational? Authorities too are folk who have read a novel or seen a movie about the "ad game." Most authoritative among authorities is that Everyman who, with houseful, garageful and bellyful of advertised products, scornfully says, "Hell, that lousy advertising doesn't influence *me*!"

Madison Avenue, USA, by Martin Mayer (Harper; $4.95).

Which is a curious state of affairs because until now there hasn't been even one solid, comprehensive, deeply probing, brilliantly illuminating text on the subject. Well, there is now. It is *Madison Avenue, USA,* by Martin Mayer.

Mr. Mayer is neither an ex-adman novelist making a few quick bucks by tossing dead cats at his alma mater, nor is he a university professor of advertising painfully justifying the business which gives him his academic specialty. Mayer is Mayer, and Mayer is a good, objective, thorough reporter. And although he says, "Only the very brave or the very ignorant can say exactly what it is that advertising does in the market place," I am convinced that Mr. Mayer very nearly achieves the exactitude which he correctly disclaims.

The book itself offers the very best evidence that its author did both his legwork and his homework. From several hundreds of interviews with top echelon people in the business he brought back such astonishingly candid quotations as: "The important thing, when we had it"—referring to the TV show called, *The $64,000 Question*—"was the poor slobs we put on—people could identify with them. BBDO began using prominent figures. Randolph Churchill, for Christ sake! You lose all the empathy." And, "The advertising agency has a great and golden opportunity to change all that crap —"

This is the authentic patois, perhaps slightly laundered, of Madison Avenue and environs, the home of big time, big money advertising. It is hard, fast, colorful—but taken in context, it makes sense. It is a far cry from the inane shoptalk often attributed to admen by critics who haven't actually talked with any.

Having finished his exhaustive legwork, almost certainly more extensively and perceptively than anyone had done it before, Mr. Mayer pitched into his homework with cold objectivity, intellectual acumen and stout integrity. Of the deplorable state of television he writes:

> In their desperate competition with each other, CBS and NBC have progressively lowered the *class* of their program lists to win the top ratings. There is no record that either network has ever refused to continue a cheesy, tasteless show which was receiving a high Neilson.

Of research to test the effectiveness of advertising:

> Nobody can say as a fact what percentage of the work that agencies do along these lines is self-serving and essentially dishonest; estimates range from one-quarter to three-quarters of the total.

It is with regret that the conscientious reviewer finds it necessary to dissent from a couple of Mayer's opinions. The first of these maintains that *economically,* advertising increased the value received by a customer who buys a high-priced, glamorized lipstick or, presumably, soda pills which can cure only psychosomatic headaches. It is true that the buyer does in the one case feel herself more beautiful for using the lipstick; in the other, does get rid of the headache. To this extent the buyer has bought an actual benefit, a real value. But most certainly this kind of "value" is cancelled out, again economically, because it *detracts from* the value of equally meritorious but less expensive brands. It is hard to see the economic justification for making one woman feel that she's beautiful because she's wearing Elizabeth Arden's guck, while making a half dozen women suffer from cosmetic deficiency anemia because they can afford nothing better than proletarian goo from the dime store.

My second dissent has to do with Mr. Mayer's too-facile disposition of the advertising technic as a factor in politics. While the prospect of the admind manipulating elections "provokes a queasy stomach" in the author, he seems to think that advertising's ability to get votes has been vastly overrated. And so it has; but only because we haven't yet had the rare combination of a sophisticated client (candidate) and a genius-touched creative adman capable of adding that extra value for the consumer (voter). We haven't had a Claude Hopkins or a J. Sterling Getch-

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ell re-styling the product, giving it a new "brand image," convincing the suckers that it will give them values much more desirable and immediate than a feeling of being beautiful. This we haven't had—yet. But who among us will stand and say that we can't and won't have it—ever?

THEATRE

"A World Classic . . . or Nothing"

AT ONE POINT during *Back to Methuselah* I was reminded of a pageant written especially for the Epworth League by our rector's intrepid daughter. At another moment I thought back to a "modernistic" morality play put on by an earnest little-theatre group in the early thirties. But at no time could I believe that this offering was the work of Bernard Shaw being done on the professional stage.

Back to Methuselah, by Bernard Shaw—adapted, by Arnold Moss (Ambassador Theatre).

Back to Methuselah was finished in 1921. It ran just over 90,000 words and just under 10 hours' playing time. The Theatre Guild bravely produced it in three weekly installments (for *just* three weeks) in 1922. Since then little has been seen of it.

Now, however, Arnold Moss—with permission from the Shaw Estate—has cut the original play down to two and a half hours, which makes it more manageable, but little better. I'm afraid that the real trouble with *Back to Methuselah* is that it substitutes wind for wit and that its philosophy is both confused and confusing.

Shaw's basic premise is that man's life span should not be three score and ten but that he should will himself to live to a ripe old three hundred—long enough to learn how to live; old enough and wise enough to manage the civilization around him.

Beginning in the Garden of Eden with Adam (Tyrone Power in brown fleshings, leaves and a bulge above and below his dance belt) and Eve (Faye Emerson got up for Delsarte in lots of pink gauze and blonde hair), *Back to Methuselah* carries us garrulously up to 31,958 A.D. I felt every minute of it.

After Adam and Eve discover the glory of creating life, Cain comes along a few centuries late to extoll the joys of destroying it. Along about 1920 we discover the dubious pleasure of willing ourselves into the hundreds to cope with the killers and the hopeless. The second act propels us into the future where—with a great amount of electronic-type beeping and squawking—we visit a strangely passé world of 2108, a Buck Rogers 3000 and, finally, a distastefully sterile age in the 319th Century called "As Far as Thought Can Reach." It was a good deal farther than I cared to go.

The play's cutter, Arnold Moss, appears intermittently as GBS himself, in knickerbockers, Norfolk jacket, pince-nez and an ill-fitting wig, to tell us what's going on. He's just the man to do it and his impersonation is a good one, but it doesn't help much.

Tyrone Power as the perpetual Adam has some good moments, but not enough of them. Faye Emerson is a lot better than she might have been considering the galaxy of tiresome roles and gassy speeches required of her. Valerie Bettis makes a very pretty serpent and Arthur Treacher—the only real Shavian actor in the lot—was, at least to me, disappointing.

Margaret Webster's direction is leaden and unimaginative. The six settings are Disneyesque and the costumes generally unbecoming. In short, it isn't the sort of evening I can recommend very highly.

BUT since everyone concerned is both talented and experienced, who is to blame? I think it is Shaw. Witty, wise and iconoclastic, too little of these qualities shines through the long, prosy scenes. He was, perhaps, too wrapped up in his material to see that he had written a tract to be read and not a play to be performed. Yet this is his favorite play, his "masterpiece." His final words on the subject were: "*Back to Methuselah* is a world classic or it is nothing." As presented by the Theatre Guild in 1958, it is nothing. PATRICK DENNIS

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RECORDS

Chamber Music — Renaissance, Baroque, Classic

ITALY has been producing a large number of string-players of virtuoso caliber who have formed small ensembles of outstanding quality. First the Quartetto Italiano amazed us with the extraordinary transparency and radiance of the blended tone of its four strings, the refinement of its execution and phrasing. Then the chamber groups—the Virtuosi di Roma, I Musici, the Societa Corelli—exhibited not only a similar beauty of tone and refinement of style but an incandescence of precise execution and expressive warmth. These are heard in the Virtuosi di Roma's performances of several engaging unfamiliar works on Angel 45019: Albinoni's Oboe Concerto Op. 7 No. 6; his Sonata Op. 2 No. 3, which has two especially fine slow movements; a Vivaldi Concerto in C for two oboes; a Concertino in G attributed to Pergolesi, which also has two superb slow movements. The excellent solo oboists are Renato Zanfini and Michele Visai.

A few years ago a Yugoslav string chamber group of the same type and caliber as the Italians—I Soloisti di Zagreb—began to be heard here in concert and on records. Vanguard 488 offered its performances of the first four of Rossini's charming Sonatas for two violins, cello and bass; and Vanguard BG-560 the performances of two fine Vivaldi Oboe Concertos in D minor and F and other Vivaldi pieces. And now Vanguard BG-564 offers the performances of Vivaldi's *The Four Seasons,* the best-known first four violin concertos of the set of twelve entitled *Il Cimento dell' Armoria e dell' Invenzione,* with Jan Tomasow as soloist. These are brilliant performances in a more vigorous style than the ones of the Virtuosi di Roma and inclined to faster tempos, which I find less effective in the slow movements than the slower tempos of the Virtuosi.

Those who know Boccherini only from the spurious Cello Concerto in B flat can get a truer idea of him from the unfamiliar Cello Concerto in C on Period 732. They will hear in its substance the operation of his individual, unpredictable and interesting mind; and in the Sinfonia in C on the same record that operation is less interesting in the substance than in the curious structure, which is like that of a concerto in its alternation of tuttis with passages for solo instruments (including a guitar), and in its cadenza-like passage for these solo instruments after a six-four chord. A pleasant little Sinfonia Concertante for oboe, bassoon and orchestra by Cambini is also on the record. Jean Decroos is the outstandingly fine solo cellist; Laila Storch and Robert Cole are the good solo oboe and bassoon; and the Orchestra Accademia del' Orso plays well under Newell Jenkins.

The first three of the Rossini Quartets Nos. 1, 4, 5 and 6 for wind instruments on Period 737 are arrangements of the sonatas for strings played by I Solisti di Zagreb on Vanguard 488. And since those instrumental pieces Rossini composed in his teens are written in the operatic style of his maturity, they require in performance the lilt and the nuances of tempo and inflection of that style—which strings may find it easier to achieve than winds, or which European strings may have a sense for that American winds lack, but which in fact the performances of I Solisti have and the ones of Messrs. Baron, Glazer, Garfield and Barrows don't have. Moreover the writing includes occasional coloratura passages, which Barrows and Garfield execute very impressively on the horn and bassoon, but which strings can execute not only more easily but more expressively.

Most of the music I have been discussing is unfamiliar, and some of it is unusual; but though the Boccherini operation is individual and unpredictable, it is not strange and daring to the ear as Gesualdo's writing is in the madrigals and sacred pieces on Columbia ML-5234. The melodic and harmonic progressions that are so strange and daring make a powerful and moving musical sense in every instance; and the pieces are among the most remarkable that have come down to us. The singers whom Robert Craft conducts on the Columbia record sing with musical intelligence and expressiveness but haven't as beautiful voices as those he conducted in a different group of Gesualdo madrigals on Sunset 600 a few years ago. And I might add that in music so closely bound up with the developing sense of the words, one gains by having the original texts that were provided with the Sunset record and not just the English translations on the Columbia envelope.

After the strangeness and occasional harshness of Gesualdo's music the ear revels in the lovely polyphony of some of the pieces in Dowland's *First Book of Ayres* as sung by the vocal group of Pro Musica Antiqua of Brussels on Period 727. A few are sung as solo songs; and in these the voices are not attractive and the foreign-accented English is disturbing.

TURNING from old and unfamiliar music to standard repertory, I can report that two fine works for violin, Tartini's *Devil's Trill* Sonata (edited by Kreisler) and Vitali's Chaconne, are on Epic LC-3414, played by Grumiaux with his beautiful tone, brilliant technique and very satisfying musical skill. He also plays Corelli's *La Follia*—or rather, another arrangement of this much-arranged piece, this one by his accompanist, Riccardo Castagnone. I haven't been able to check it with the original score; but assuming the accuracy of the solo part I find the piece agreeable but not interesting throughout its considerable length. And the fourth work on the record is the not very interesting Veracini Sonata Op. 7 No. 1.

Grumiaux, who recorded a beautiful performance of Beethoven's Sonata Op. 96 with Clara Haskil, plays three other Beethoven sonatas with her on Epic LC-3400: Op. 12 No. 1, the engaging Op. 23 and the genial Op. 24 (*Spring*). Again one hears beautifully integrated playing by the two musicians; but Haskil's playing lacks the strength this music requires. The recording is overresonant.

B. H. HAGGIN

Notes on Contributors

WALTER Z. LAQUEUR, editor of *Soviet Survey,* is at present on the staff of the Harvard Russian Research Center. THE REV. PETER SALMON is the pseudonym of a Connecticut exurbanite and weekend farmer. JOHN G. SCHNEIDER is the author of *The Golden Kazoo,* a satirical novel about advertising and politics.

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Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

was written to assure good service. It was concerned primarily with the right of the consumer to enjoy good service. The right of the broadcaster to make money was secondary.

For some years the Commission took heed of this objective. It has always been under intense pressure, however, from the broadcasting industry, its trade associations, and its trade papers. The listeners were unorganized, and could generate very little counter-pressure. It took a very brave and very dedicated Commissioner, indeed, to insist on strict regulation in the public interest. The high-water mark of such dedication was the famous Blue Book of 1946, which set standards for program quality.

In particular, the Blue Book pointed out that listeners were being deluged with commercials. It proposed, in the future, to consider the adequacy of program service in making grants of station licenses. All this was merely an application of the Communications Act of 1934, but the howls from some self-appointed industry spokesmen were deafening. They cried "censorship" and charged that free speech was jeopardized.

Since that time there has been a steady erosion of Commission standards. The strenuous enforcement promised by the Blue Book never materialized. Those station managers who assumed a "listener-be-damned" attitude were allowed to go scot-free. Applications for new stations were not scrutinized to see which applicant would actually render the best program service.

When the Congressional Committee completes its exposure of individual malfeasance, let us hope it will give some attention to the problem of how well the public is being serviced.

CLARA S. LOGAN, *President*
Nat'l Assn. for Better Radio & Television
Los Angeles, California

► *The Tender Trap*

SIRS:

MARGARET HALSEY'S "Beware the Tender Trap" (*NR*, January 13) may have succeeded in trapping many readers because of the manner in which the author tailored a quotation from *The Reporter* to suit her own requirements. I feel that it is the duty of the Editors of *NR* to correct the erroneous impression of the original work created by this type of reporting. This is especially true because *NR* has campaigned so diligently (and evidently ineffectively) against the use of such tactics in other publications. I also believe that *The Reporter* deserves a better break.

The editorial in question appeared in an unsigned column (which, incidentally, is a regular feature) entitled "The Reporter's Notes" in the December 12 number of *The Reporter*. The sentence which was twisted by Margaret Halsey is quoted below in its entirety with the portion she used in italics.

> *We don't see any reason why* Nixon should be given a retroactive grant of confidence, or why *he should be the object of permanent distrust.* We will just redouble our watch.

I think that the paragraph preceding the above sentences in "The Reporter's Notes" further justifies my feeling that the Halsey quotation does not convey the original meaning.

> About the Vice-President, as distinguished from the former member of Congress, the best we can say is that we don't know anything. He has been understudying so many different roles and reciting so many different scripts that it is impossible to say how he would act as protagonist. It has been said that he is growing. But considering the opportunities that came to him during his more than five years in office, it would have taken some real, stubborn effort not to grow.

This may seem like "nit-picking" to you, but I feel that since I felt misled by the Halsey article, others should be given the benefit of my doubt.

GEORGE R. ELLIOTT
Yokohoma, Japan

. . . Miss Halsey replies

MR. ELLIOTT'S real objection seems to be against Mr. Nixon's past record being mentioned at all, since the sense of the whole quotation he adduces is no different from the sense of that part of it I used.

That sense is, that *The Reporter*—at this late date—is still prepared to suspend judgment on the man who campaigned against Mrs. Douglas by charging that she was a Communist.

It is just because *The Reporter* has always been a champion of liberalism that one regrets seeing it slip inadvertently into the Let's-not-be-beastly-to-the-Hun attitude.

MARGARET HALSEY
White Plains, N. Y.

► *Who Is Slipping?*

SIRS:

THE substance of the recently concluded pact between the President and the ineffable Mr. Nixon reminds one of the pithy passage in *Gil Blas*, by Le Sage,

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relating to the question of whether or not the archbishop might be lapsing into a state of *non compos mentis*. A very similar dialogue might conceivably develop should Dickie Boy suggest that Ike was "slipping." The following is a translation of Le Sage's text.

GIL BLAS: Your homilies have always been admired, but it seems to me that the last did not appear to have had so powerful an effect upon the audience as former ones.

ARCHBISHOP: How, Sir, has it met with any Aristarchus [arch-critic]?

GIL BLAS: No, Sir, by no means, such works as yours are not to be criticized; everybody is charmed with them. Nevertheless, since you have laid your injunctions upon me to be free and sincere, I will take the liberty to tell you that your last discourse, in my judgment, has not altogether the energy of your other performances. Did you not think so, Sir, yourself?

ARCHBISHOP: So then, Mr. Gil Blas, this piece is not to your taste?"

GIL BLAS: I don't say so, Sir, I think it excellent, although a little inferior to your other works.

ARCHBISHOP: I understand you; you think I flag, don't you? Come, be plain; you believe it time for me to think of retiring.

GIL BLAS: I should not have been so bold as to speak so freely, if your grace had not commanded me; I do no more, therefore, than obey you; and I most humbly beg that you will not be offended at my freedom.

ARCHBISHOP: God forbid that I should find fault with it. I don't at all take it ill that you should speak your sentiments, it is your sentiment itself, only that I find bad. I have been egregiously deceived in your narrow understanding.

GIL BLAS: Your grace will pardon me for obeying—

ARCHBISHOP: Say no more, my child, you are yet too raw to make proper distinctions. Be it known to you, I never composed a better homily than that which you disapprove; for my genius, thank heaven, hath as yet lost nothing of its vigor; henceforth I will make a better choice of a confidant. Go, go, Mr. Gil Blas. Adieu, Mr. Gil Blas! I wish you all manner of prosperity, —with a little more taste.

WALTER M. STONE

Cambridge, Mass.

► *Lawmakers & Their Constituents*

SIRS:

"THERE'S NOTHING WRONG with Congressmen intervening on behalf of constituents . . . "

Well said by your TRB (*NR*, March 31). It is almost always entirely proper for a legislator to write to an administrator on behalf of a constituent. The administrator is better informed about the workings of his commission or department than a legislator can possibly be. The communication gives the administrator an opportunity to explain the rules and considerations controlling the governmental action to be taken.

For example, when I was a public utility commissioner in Illinois we received frequent requests for preferential treatment in the allocation of natural gas, made on behalf of people who had little idea of why they could not get the gas while their neighbors could. We were accustomed to reply with a full and clear explanation of the system that we used and the necessity for allocation pending the construction of additional pipelines from the gas-producing states. We would send the legislator a copy of our letter to pass on to his constituent.

Most people were satisfied when they learned that there was an impartial system. The others did not complain much, because it is a rare legislator who wants to come right out and ask that his constituent be allowed to cheat, and because of a dawning realization that the request would be unavailing.

WALTER T. FISHER

Chicago, Illinois

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

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